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Abstract:  In this paper we undertake a systematic investigation of instrument choice when 
preventing a population collapse rather than maximizing industry profit is the overriding concern. 
Contrary to what seems to be the general consensus we find that landing fees do provide more 
effective insurance against extinction than quotas under more or less the same conditions as those 
implying that landing fees are better at maximising industry profit. Thus, the efficiency of the 
regulatory instrument mainly depends on the basic information asymmetries characterizing the 
fishery, and is not sensitive to whether the regulators total catch goals are set according to economic 
or precautionary principles.  
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Threatened extinctions of fish stocks capture headlines periodically and not without reason. 
Collapses of locally important fishing stocks have been experienced in a number of cases, often 
with dramatic consequences for the affected fishermen and local communities. An example of such 
a collapse is the Atlanto-Scandic herring stock at the end of the 60s (see Primack (1998)) and a 
number of fisheries are currently threatened. 
1 The practical reality for many fishery  regulators is in 
fact dominated  by the concern that fish stocks have been reduced to a level where the resource 
itself may be threatened and therefore possibly also the surrounding ecosystem, fishing industry and 
local communities
2. For these regulators the industry profit  objective that is the dominant welfare 
measure in the fisheries economics literature may seem too narrow. While there is a (mainly 
biological) literature that provides a foundation for setting goals when the regulator is concerned 
about the risk of a extinction there is little guidance to be found in the literature as to the choice of 
regulatory instrument in this situation. We will address this issue in the following.   
The biological literature presents a picture of what a fish stock collapse is and how it 
may occur (see Soule (1987), Raup (1991), Quammen (1996),Primack (1998), Hutchings (2000), 
Hutchings and Reynolds (2004) and Pauly (2009)). At the core of this literature is the recognition 
that  species viability is determined by stochastic processes, and that the key viability concept 
should be cast in terms of probability. Of primary relevance here is that low population levels 
become risky because of stochastic variation affecting the biological regeneration process 
characterising the fish stock. This literature has provided the operational concept of maximum 
                                                 
1 Examples of threatened fisheries are numourous e.g. Tridacna gigas on many Pacific islands (Tegner et al,1996), 
Bolbometopol mullcatum on many Indo-Pacific shores (Roberts and Hawkins,1999), Stereolepis gigas on parts of the  
California cost (Jennings et al ,2001),  Diptures tatis in the Irish Sea (Dulvy et al, 2000), Pterapogan kauderni in India 
(Tegner et al,1996), Cod in the North Sea (Banks et al,2000).   
2  For example within the EU the precautionary principle dominates(see Holden (1994)). This principle states that 
regulators must ensure that a fish stock do not collapse (see Anon (2008)) FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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allowable catch (reflecting the largest acceptable probability of extinction during the following 
seasons) which in fact is the foundation for e.g. Anon (2008) recommendations and the EU 
common fisheries policy stock goals and harvest quotas set according to the precautionary principle. 
Though the focus of this literature is far from the choice between regulatory instruments, this choice 
is discussed occasionally in an informal way, and output quotas are almost exclusively 
recommended (see e.g. Primack (1998), Raup (1991) and Hutchings (2000)). The flavour of the 
underlying argument is that with an output quota the catch is certain while this is not the case when 
a landing fee is used, and so the quota instrument helps reduces uncertainty about the resulting post 
harvest stock levels.   
In the fisheries economics literature a handful of authors have considered the potential 
collapse of fish stocks (see Clark (1990), Bulte and van Kooten (1999) , Bjørndal et al (2004), 
Standal (2006),  Ekerhovd (2008) and Clark et al (2010). These studies all use a deterministic 
biological reproduction function that allows for a non-concave interval of negative growth at low 
stocks implying a minimum viable population level, under which the stock will collapse. The choice 
of regulatory instrument is once again not the main focus of this literature, but Bulte and van 
Kooten (1999), Bjørndal et al (2004) and Ekerhovd (2008) do recommend the use of quotas without 
any discussion. The underlying argument is the same as in the biological literature. A quota ensures 
that the regulators catch target is met with certainty while this does not hold for a fee.  
  A number of recent papers in the fisheries economics literature have investigated 
which regulatory instrument is best at maximising industry profit under various types of regulatory 
uncertainty (Weitzman (2002), Jensen and Vestergaard (2003), Hannesson and Kennedy (2005), 
Hansen (2008), Fisher and Laxminarayan (2010) and Hansen et al (2008)).  Here Weitzman (2002) 
is the paper of primary interest since he shows that if uncertainty about the biological regeneration 
process dominates, then landing fees are preferred to quotas. This result contrasts with the quota FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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recommendation coming out of the above mentioned literature.  However, Weitzman (2002) studies 
a fish stock that is not threatened by extinction and where the regulators problem is to find the 
regulatory instrument that is best at fine tuning harvest to maximise industry profit. Thus this result 
seems of limited relevance when the regulators problem is to find the instrument that provides the 
most effective insurance against a threat of extinction.  
This is our point of departure. In this paper we address the question of how best to 
insure against extinction by explicitly introducing regulatory concern about population collapse into 
a stochastic stock-recruitment model of a regulated search fishery. Contrary to what seems to be the 
general consensus, we find that landing fees do provide more effective extinction insurance than 
quotas under more or less the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at 
maximising industry profit. Specifically, we show that the pro fee result for a profit maximizing 
regulator under biological uncertainty from Weitzman (2002) extends to regulators that are 
concerned about extinction.   
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we develop a general stock-recruitment 
model, while section 3 describes the problem of the regulator. Second 4 present the main results, 
while section 5 offers conclusions and qualifications.    
 
2. The Model  
We develop a dynamic stock-recruitment model in the Berverton-Holt tradition for a search fishery 
that allows for ecological uncertainty. This makes possible a detailed and explicit representation of 
the interactions between parameters about which there is uncertainty and regulatory constraints.   
 Let  Rt,  denote the stock of fish available at the beginning of fishing period t before 
fishing starts (which we will call recruitment) and let St-1 denote the stock left at the end of period t-FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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1 after fishing has stopped. Finally let  t ε  denote stochastic effects on the fish stocks of variations 
in, for example, water temperature and weather so that:
 3 
 
1 () tt t RR S ε − =+                (1) 
  
Thus we assume that natural growth takes place between fishing seasons and what we 
call recruitment is stock at the end of the previous fishing season plus natural growth between the 
two seasons.
4. Harvest during period t (denoted Ht) reduces fish stock during the period so that: 
 
ttt SRH =−       ( 2 )  
 
Clearly harvest is bounded above by recruitment and bellow by zero: 
 
 0 tt HR ≤≤        (3) 
 
We assume that  t ε  are independently distributed with unbounded distribution functions  (.) t g  and 
that [ ] 0 t E ε =
5. The stock of fish available at the beginning of period t is a function of the stock 
available at the end of the previous period and stochastic variations in ecosystem conditions. In the 
following we will assume that:
6 
                                                 
3 Note that the stochastic term is assumed to be additive. The reason for this will be clear in connection with (4) A 
multiplicative error term is common within fisheries (see e.g. Reed (1979)) but the results in the present paper 
generalize to non-additive error terms. 
4 This definition of recruitment is typical in the stochastic bioeconomics tradition( see e.g. Reed (1979) and Weitzman 
(2002)). Other studies define recruitment as the addition to the stock between close of one and the beginning of the next 
fishing season.(see Clark (1990) 
5 Results in the following easily generalize to non-additive correlated stochastic shocks, but these assumptions simplify 
the presentation.       









( ) 0    if     











       ( 4 )  
 
so that the recruitment function is discontinuous at 
0 S (if 
0 0 S > ) reflecting that there is a critical 
level of stock below which regeneration is not possible
7. If the stock through a combination of 
fishing and natural shocks is reduced under this critical level (i.e. if 
0
1 tt SS ε − +<) at the end of a 
fishing season then it is no longer able to recover because gross recruitment becomes smaller than 
mortality and the stock declines to zero. This may take several fishing seasons, but the process is 
irreversible once initiated and so assuming an immediate plunge to zero seems a parsimonious way 
of capturing the ever present risk of extinction.
8 Thus, if 
0
1 tt SS ε − +< at some point in time, then 
the stock disappears and is not available for fishing in any future periods. Provided 
0 S is close to or 
equal to zero then the fish stock has substantial regenerative power and can recover from substantial 
overfishing and unfavourable natural shocks to its ecosystem. If, on the other hand, 
0 0 S >> , then 
the stock is more vulnerable to overfishing and natural shocks. A useful way of expressing 
vulnerability is the risk of extinction associated with a known size of the ‘end of period’ stock  1 t S − . 




1 () ( )
t SS




= ∫       ( 5 )  
 
                                                 
7 This is the substantive difference in the basic model compared to Weitzmann (2002), who assumes that the fish stock 
cannot become extinct (i.e. that  0 t R > for all realizations of  t ε  irrespective of the initial stock value 1 t S − . 
8 At S
o the growth function is defined as subject to critical dispensation (see Clark (1990) and Ekerhovd (2008) for an 
introduction to the concept).  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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 is the risk of extinction associated with this stock size which by definition is always positive
9.  
We assume that fishermen have constant returns to scale, but that fishing costs depend 
on the size of the fish stock because of search costs (see e.g. Neher (1990)).
10 Following Hannesson 
and Kennedy (2005), let  () x π  be the marginal profit of harvest for the representative fisherman 
when x is the current stock of fish. At the beginning of the fishing season the fish stock equals 
recruitment ( t x R = ). However, as harvest progresses stock is reduced (by one unit for every unit 
harvested) and so marginal profit is reduced as fishing progresses over the season. The total profit 
of harvesting  t H  during the season ( ( , ) tt HR Π ) is found by integrating marginal profit from initial 
stock recruitment available at the beginning of the period (Rt ) to the stock available at the end of 
the period (Rt-Ht):  
 






HR x d x π
−
Π= ∫       ( 6 )  
 
Fishermen observe current fish stock during the season as they fish (in the sense that they observe 
the realized relationship between effort and catch during the fishing season). Thus, the 
representative fisherman in effect observes recruitment with certainty. Without regulation the 
fisherman chooses the catch level that maximises his profit (given the realisation of  t ε ) where the 
first order condition for maximising current profit (6) is: 
 









=− =         ( 7 )  
                                                 
9 Note that the corresponding risk of extinction in the model studied by Weitzmann (2002) in contrast is zero for all 
possible initial stock values 1 t S − . 
10 We include stock effects for generality. Note however that marginal stock effects are small for most species  (see 




Thus subject to the constraint (3) fishermen stop catching fish when the same end of season stock is 
reached (
1(0) π
−  where 
1 π
− is the inverse function implicitly defined in (7))   irrespective of the 
initial natural shock to recruitment. Letting 
0
t H  denote the catch fishermen find optimal in the 
unregulated situation by (3) and (7) we have that
11: 
  
01 (( 0 ) , 0 ) tt HM a x R π
− =−         ( 8 )  
 
Regulation and the distribution and timing of information 
The basic regulatory set up and distribution of information follows Weitzman (2002). Initially the 
regulator chooses between two regulatory instruments, a landing fee, t Φ , that representative 
fishermen must pay per unit harvest, or a maximum harvest quota,  t Q , that the representative 
fisherman must respect.
12 The regulator may adjust the value of the chosen instrument at the 
beginning of each period. At the beginning of the period when the regulator sets the value of the 
chosen regulatory instrument ( t Φ  or  t Q ),  he observes the fish stock,  1 t S − , but not recruitment  t R . 
Thus, while fishermen observe recruitment, the regulator only knows the probability distribution (
(.) t g ) over possible states of nature  t ε  that will apply at the end of the season when next period´s 
stock is recruited. Given the value of the regulatory instrument set by the regulator at the beginning 
                                                 
11 We assume that marginal profit is zero before the entire stock is caught i.e. 
1(0) 0 π
− > so that the upper bound on 
catch (
0 ) tt H R ≤ is always satisfied. 
12 We ignore issues of enforcement and compliance and assume that regulations are perfectly enforced. We also assume 
that quotas are tradable. When quotas are tradable all individual fishermen perceive the same shadow price of quotas 
and so (as for fee regulation), the representative fisherman subject to quota regulation represents a perfect aggregate of 
an ITQ regulated industry (see Hansen et al (2008))).This gives a parsimonious formulation of the problem of 
instrument choice.     FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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of the period the fisherman chooses the catch level that maximises his profit (given the realisation 
of  t ε ).  




tt t H Min Q H =       ( 9 )  
 
 Thus, the effect of the chosen instrument value on harvest can not be predicted with certainty by 
the regulator (even though we assume perfect compliance). Though the regulator knows with 
certainty that 
Q
tt H Q ≤  there is generally a positive probability that 
0 Q
tt t H HQ =<  since 
0
t H  
depends on    t ε   about which the regulator is uncertain. The resulting period t total profit is 
(, )
Q
tt H R Π . The profit expected by the regulator at the beginning of period t is the expectation of 





⎡⎤ Π ⎣⎦ ) where both 
Q
t H  and recruitment  t R  depend on  t ε  
Under landing fee regulation the fisherman chooses the catch that maximises current 
period profit













⎝⎠ ∫       ( 1 0 )
    
 
The first-order condition is:   
 
                                                 
13 We make the standard assumption that fishermen are myopic in the sense that they disregard the effect that current 
catch has on future profit. This assumption is reasonable in situations where the number of fishermen extracting from 
the common fish stock is large.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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1() tt t RHπ
− −= Φ .We can define the resulting optimal catch as the following function of 
recruitment, fee rate and profit function parameter. Inserting (4) this implies that:  
 
 
1 (,) ( () , 0 ) tt t t t HR M a x R π
Φ− Φ= − Φ     (12) 
 
Thus, both the resulting harvest and aggregate fishing season profit depends on   t ε   about which the 
regulator is uncertain.  
.  
3. The Regulator   
It is useful as a reference point to introduce the regulator’s problem of maximising the sum of 
discounted expected future profit the policy choice criterion assumed in most of the fisheries 
economics literature (and in all of the above mentioned contributions on instrument choice). The 
expected sum of discounted future profits at the beginning of period t is:  
 
  [] 1
0







=Π ∑        (13) 
 
(13) is maximised subject to (1),(2)  and (3), where a is the discount factor, and all probabilities and 
expectations are conditional on the information available to the regulator at the beginning of period 
t. Note specifically that this expression takes into account that there is a risk of the resource 
disappearing. The solution to the regulator’s dynamic programming problem at the beginning of FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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period  t  where the value of the instrument has to be set is conditional on recruitment at the 
beginning of the period (Rt), the distributions held over  t ε  and 1 t ε + , 2 t ε + …,  and also conditional on 
the harvest-instrument function of the chosen instrument. Let  ()
I
tt H I  denote the harvest-instrument 
function where I indicates the chosen instrument (i.e. under quota regulation the harvest-instrument 
function is given by (9) and under fee regulation by (12)). Corresponding to (13), the recursive 
formulation (the Bellman equation) of the dynamic optimisation problem (see e.g. Ljungqvist and 




1 () (( ) , ) ( ) ( )
II I I
tt t t t t t
t
Max
V S E H I R aV R H I
I
− ⎡⎤ =Π +− ⎣⎦    (14) 
 




t VS − ,  is the expected sum (taken over t ε , 1 t ε + … ) of discounted future 
profit under the optimal policy, conditional on  1 t S − , and 
*(( ) )
II
tt t VRH I −  is the corresponding 
expectation (taken over  1 t ε + , 2 t ε + …). Let
* I
t H denote a solution to (14). As noted above the 
probability that the resource disappears at the end of period t conditional on end of period stock is 
() t PS  (by equation (5)). This implies a  ( ) t PS probability of  1 t R + being equal to zero and so a  ( ) t PS  
probability of the (presumably zero) profit associated with the stock disappearing. This probability 
feeds into the next period´s expected profit and so on. Since this risk is influenced by the harvest 
during season t chosen by the regulator at the beginning of the season the effect that this has on the 
risk of extinction will be taken into account. The harvest levels the regulator implements are 
adjusted to ensure that the increase in risk of future profit loss due to extinction caused by a 
marginal harvest increase just balances the gain in current profits. Thus a regulator who only values 
industry profit does take the risk of extinction into account to the extent that it affects discounted 
future profits.  However, the optimal response to the introduction of a risk of extinction may be to FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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reduce fish stocks compared to a situation without this risk which increases the risk of extinction 
further (see e.g. Sutinen 1981). This is because expected profit from leaving fish stock for future 
harvest is reduced when the risk of extinction is introduced.    
 
Regulator preferences for precaution   
Now consider a regulator concerned with reducing the risk of extinction. Such a regulator dislikes 
scenarios where  t S comes close to or is reduced below
0 S . As already noted, such a concern is to a 
specific extent implied by maximisation of industry profit as specified above, and if this is the only 
driver of ‘precautionary’ regulation then its practical implications cannot meaningfully be 
distinguished from profit maximising regulation. However, we have in the previous section argued 
that such a precautionary concern may also be driven by a general environmental valuation of the 
exploited ecosystem over and above its value as an economic resource for the fishing industry. In 
addition, precautionary regulation may be driven by concerns for the negative indirect effects that a 
fisheries extinction might have on local communities. If concern for external effects of this type is 
important for fisheries managers then ‘precautionary’ concerns distinct from those derived from 
profit maximisation may apply and there may be a real trade off between profit and the risk of 
extinction. For example the optimal reaction to the introduction of a risk of extinction might then be 
to increase fish stocks instead of reducing them as profit maximisation may imply. To reflect such 
additional concerns we assume that the regulator may also associate an additional disutility with the 
risk of extinction  ( ) t PS i.e.:       
 










<  and  '' 0 u <  (15)
   FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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where we assume that marginal utility,  (.) u , is decreasing and concave in ultimo stock size 
(reflecting that the regulator derives disutility from increasing risk of extinction).  
One reason for such an added precautionary utility element is if the regulator associates an 
existence value with the fish stock (as e.g. suggested by Van Kooten and Bulte (2000)). If the 
present value of this utility flow is w then the expected utility loss from extinction as a function of 
stock would be  ( ) tt uw P S =  . Equation (15) is therefore a general expression that can capture this 
and other welfare losses that the regulator associates with extinction of the fish stock. 
 
The concavity assumption implies that the regulator is risk averse. That is, at the beginning of 
period  t, he prefers implementation of any particular final stock level with certainty to 
implementation resulting in a distribution over possible ultimo stock levels with this mean value. 
This would seem to capture the type of added concern about increasing the risk of a resource 
extinction by depleting stocks that many regulators appear to have. Assuming that  t u  is normalized 
to the monetary unit used to measure profit the regulators utility function becomes  tt t Uu =+ Π and 
he seeks to maximize the sum of discounted future expected utility
14: 
 
             
[] 1
0








   
(16)   
 
4. Instrument choice under ecological uncertainty 
 
                                                 
14 Note that this is a general regulator utility function that contains the traditional profit maximizing regulator at one 
extreme where the u is zero and  the precautionary regulator at the other extreme where the scale of  u  goes to infinity. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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In this section we study how well a regulator can do if he uses the quota instrument compared to 
using the fee instrument when he is uncertain about  t ε  (the current state of nature). It is useful 
initially to define a first best benchmark case against which we can evaluate different regulatory 
instruments. Let this benchmark case be the catch that the regulator would want to set if he could 
perfectly predict the realisation  t ε  before setting instrument values for season t. Under these 






((( ) ) ( ,( ) )
(, )




tt t t t
uPRS H H RS Max
WS








+− + Π + ⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ − ⎝⎠
   (17) 
 
The value function, 
*
1 (, ) tt WS ε − ,  is the expected sum (taken over 1 t ε + , 2 t ε + …, where  t ε  is perfectly 
predicted) of discounted future profit under the optimal policy, conditional on  1 t S − , and 
*
1 (, ) tt t WR Hε + −  is the corresponding expectation (taken over  2 t ε + , 3 t ε + …, where  1 t ε +  is perfectly 
predicted). Note that  t ε  enters into (17) only through its effect on recruitment  t R  which is now 
made explicit for clarity. Let
*() tt H ε denote the unique solution to (17) where this solutions 
dependence on  t ε  is also made explicit for clarity. Note that while this solution assumes that  t ε  is 
perfectly predicted the regulator is uncertain about all future period realisations when setting catch 
at the beginning of period t. Specifically he only holds a distribution over possible  1 t ε +  values. This 
implies that at the beginning of season t when the regulator sets the harvest level for the season 
there is uncertainty about the natural shock to the stock at the end of the season. There is, therefore, 
a risk of  1 () (( ) ) tt t t t PS PR S H ε − =+ −  that the fish stock will disappear at the end of fishing season 
t (i.e.  the risk that  1 0 t R + = ) the utility value of which is taken into account when solving (17). 










(, ( ) )
' ((( ) ) )









uP R S H
dH
















    (18) 
 
Incerting the derivative of the second term given by (7) and the definition (2) assuming an interior 


















−+ + = ⎢⎥
⎣⎦  
    (19) 
 
 
Note that this equation does not depend on   t R  . Thus when optimum is defined in terms of end of 
season stocks recruitment drops out of the equation and so the optimal solution does not depend on 
natural shocks to recruitment at the beginning of period t,  t ε . Let 
*
t S denote the solution implied by 
(19) which is the end of season stock that results when optimal harvest (
*() tt H ε ) is implemented. 
The optimal harvest is given by (2) as a function of end of season stocks and recruitment and so it 
does depend on  t ε  in a specific way. Since optimal stock at the end of the fishing season is 
independent of  t ε   the optimal harvest during the period must be adjusted to exactly counteract the 
effect that natural shocks have on recruitment. This is an important property of the first best 
solution to (17) and it is critical for the results we show in the following.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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We use the solution to (17) (
*() tt H ε  ) as the first-best reference against which we 
evaluate the quota and fee policy instruments actually available to the regulator. To facilitate this 






(, , ) ( ( ( ) ) ) (, ( ) )
(( ) , )
t
tt t t t t t t t
tt t t
WHS uPRS H H RS






=+ − + Π +
⎡⎤ ++ − ⎣⎦
   (20) 
 
This function gives the present value when harvesting  t H in period t and then harvesting optimally 






(, , ) (, )
            and
( , , ) ( , , )   for     
tt t t t
tt t tt t t t
WH S W S







    (21) 
 
The regulator is uncertain about  t ε  but since (19) is independent of  t ε the regulator can calculate 
*
t S  
precisely. From (2) he can derive the harvest that implements this stock conditional on  t ε  which he 
does not observe: 
 
**
1 () ( ) tt t t t H RS S εε − =+ −       (22) 
 
Fee regulation 
From (12) we know that a fee of  t Φ implements the following catch: 
 
1
1 (,) ( ) () tt t t t t HR R S επ
Φ−





** () tt S π Φ=  will implement optimal catch and end of season stock irrespective of the 
realisation of  t ε . Furthermore since this parameterisation does not depend on  t ε   , which the 
regulator is uncertain about, the regulator can implement 
*() tt H ε with certainty. So from (21) we 




11 1 (( , ) ,) ( ,, ) (, )  
t tt t t t t t t t EW H RS W HS WS ε εε
Φ
−− − ⎡⎤ Φ= = ⎣⎦    (24) 
  
Thus under ecological uncertainty the regulator can set the fee level so that the the first best 
benchmark is set to implement with certainty even though the regulator is uncertain about  t ε . 
 
Quota regulation 
Under quota regulation the regulator sets harvest according to (9) and the question we want to 
answer is whether he can implement  
*
t H  with certainty using this instrument. If he cannot then the 
fee instrument is preferred.  
 
From (9) we know that a quota of  t Q implements the following catch: 
 
0
1 (,) (, ( ( ) ) )
Q
tt t t t t t HQ R M i n Q HR S ε − =+        (25) 
 
If fishermen are not quota constrained (i.e. 
0
1 (,) ( ( )
Q
tt t t t t t H QR H R S Q ε − =+ < )) they behave as if 
they are not regulated. Comparing (8) with (23) when 
*
tt Φ= Φ  it is clear that 
0*
tt H H = only when FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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* 0 t Φ= . This corresponds to the situation where no regulation is needed which is clearly not 
relevant here and so we disregard it in the following. When regulation is required (when
* 0 t Φ> ) we 
have that 
*0
tt H H <  and then optimal catch can only be implemented if the fishermen are quota 
constrained. If fishermen are quota constrained (i.e. 
0
1 (,) ( ( )
Q
tt t t t t t HQ R Q HR S ε − =< +) then catch 
is equal to the quota set by the regulator and it is clear that optimal catch is implemented only when 
*
tt QH = . Thus the regulator can only be certain to implement optimal catch when he knows 
*() tt H ε at the time when he sets the quota which generally requires him to know the realisation of
t ε . Since the regulator does not know the realisation of  t ε  but only holds a distribution  (.) t g  over 
possible  t ε  realisations he cannot in general implement   
*
t H  with certainty using this instrument 
when regulation of the fishery is required. 
To show this formally, define the recursive formulation of the regulator’s problem under quota 






((( ) ( ,( ) ) )
( ) ( (,( ) ) ,( ) )




tt t t t t t
t QQ
ttt ttt
uPRS H Q RS
Max
WS E H Q R S R S
Q









=+ Π + + ⎢⎥
⎢⎥ ++ − + ⎣⎦








11 () (, )  
Q
tt t WS W Sε −− <  for  any non-degenerate distribution g( t ε ) that 
assigns strictly positive probabilities to at least two  t ε  values whose optimal catches 
*() tt H ε  differ .  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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Proof: By  definition 
**
11 () ()  
Q







((( ) ) ) ( ,( ) ) ( )
((( ) ) ) ( ,( ) ) ( )  
() ( ,)  
Q
ttt t tt t
ttt t tt t
Q
tt t
uPRS Q Q RS a W S
uPRS Q Q RS a W S






+− + Π + + ≤









(, ) ( )  
            and
( , ) ( )   if   Q  
tt t
tt t t t
WQ S W S









11 (, ) ( )  
t tt t EW Q S WS ε −− ⎡⎤ < ⎣⎦  




tt WS WS −− <  
   
 
Corollary to Proposition I: 
**
11 () ()  
Q
tt WS W S −− =  for any degenerate distribution g( t ε
) where all  t ε  values that are assigned a  positive probability have the same 
associated optimal catch 
*() tt H ε . By setting 
*() tt t QH ε = the quota instrument 
implements this optimal catch with certainty. 
 
This implies that under ecological uncertainty (when the regulator is uncertain about natural shocks  
t ε  ) quota regulation generally implements a lower expected regulator utility level than fee 
regulation. Thus the pro-fee result found by Weitzman (2002) for ecological uncertainty extends to 
a situation where the regulator is concerned about the risk of resource extinction. FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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  Our result does, however, differ in two important respects from that of  Weitzman 
(2002). First Weitzman shows that when the object function (which in his case is industry profit) is 
concave in the fish stock and linear in catch then the value function of the corresponding recursive 
formulation of the problem will be concave. This in turn implies that the fastest possible approach 
to the long run preferred escapement is optimal (a so called bang-bang solution to the dynamic 
optimisation problem). This not only implies that the fee instrument is preferred to the quota 
instrument but that the optimal solution is implemented by imposing a constant fee (i.e. setting the 
same landing fee in all periods according to the long run preferred escapement). However, because 
of recruitment falling to zero when initial stock falls below a certain cut off level, our object 
function will not be concave in all possible fish stock values.  Thus, the value function for our 
problem is not necessarily concave in the fish stock and so we cannot be sure that the fastest 
possible approach to long run preferred escapement is optimal. What we show is that the fee 
instrument is preferred to the quota instrument and that the optimal path can be implemented with 
this instrument. However, it may be that this requires adjustment of fee levels over time (i.e. if the 
preferred adjustment to long run preferred escapement is not the ‘bang-bang’ solution). 
 The  second difference is that some degenerate distributions (that allow the quota 
instrument to perform as well as the fee instrument) may in fact be meaningful approximations of 
the practical problem faced by regulators in our case. When stocks are close to extinction and the 
regulator has a substantial concern about this he may find himself in a situation where optimal catch 
in the coming period is zero or close to zero for most realisations of  t ε . Though it would still be 
optimal to use an optimally set fee this would only induce positive harvest levels in unlikely 
situations with extraordinarily large recruitment. The expected welfare loss of closing the fishery in 
period t (i.e. setting  0 t Q = ) could be small in this situation (because 
*()0 tt H ε =  for most likely  t ε
values). Thus the quota instrument could perform almost as well as the fee instrument when the fish FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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stock is highly threatened. Clearly though as stocks are rebuilt the welfare cost of continuing to use 
quota regulation increase.       
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We have incorporated into a stock recruitment model the possibility of the fish stock becoming 
extinct as the result of stochastic natural processes and regulator concern about this. We consider 
instrument choice under biological uncertainty where the regulator is less certain about the state of 
nature when setting the value of the regulatory instrument than fishermen are when they produce. 
Because of the structure of this problem the regulator’s concern about extinction affects his 
preferred escapement (how much of the fish stock is left for next period). This is the key because 
the main difference between the two instruments is in how escapement is affected by ecological 
uncertainty. The fee ensures that the escapement left by fishermen is independent of the current 
state of nature. On the other hand escapement left by fishermen subject to a fixed quota will vary 
with the state of nature.  
Our result is that under biological uncertainty the fee instrument dominates the quota 
instrument irrespective of the regulator’s preferences over profit and precaution. The basic intuition 
here is the regulator having no uncertainty about the fisherman’s profit function can implement the 
preferred escapement using a fee because he is certain about how fishermen react to the fee 
incentive. In effect the fee allows the regulator to decentralize the decision about the size of the 
catch to fishermen who observe the state of nature since he can predict precisely what escapement 
this decentralisation will produce. Since the quota implies a fixed harvest, escapement will vary 
with the state of nature no matter the size of the quota set by the regulator.  FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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This result depends on two assumptions.  First, that there are no economies of scale in 
catch during the fishing season. Without such economies of scale the marginal profit of catch is 
independent of the season’s catch and only depends on the current fish stock which at the end of the 
season is escapement. The second assumption we need is that the risk of extinction only depends on 
the stock at the end of the season. Weitzman (2002) uses the first assumption to show that fees are 
preferred under biological uncertainty when the regulator wants to maximize profit. We use the 
second assumption to extend this result to the situation where the regulator has an additional 
concerned about extinction.   
  However, the existing literature points to several other types of uncertainty that also 
may generate systematic differences in the relative efficiency of tax versus ITQ-regulation. 
Regulators may be uncertain about profit functions (economic uncertainty). Weitzman (2002) 
speculates that quota regulation will be preferred under economic uncertainty when the regulator is 
only concerned about profit though this has not to our knowledge been shown. It can be suggested 
that a systematic difference between regulator’s monitoring and enforcement costs under price and 
quantity regulation may result if a fisherman who is cheating on ITQs is perceived as cheating other 
fishermen from whom the cheater would otherwise have to buy quotas, while cheating on a landing 
fee is seen as cheating the regulator. In addition, Hansen et al. (2008) suggest that compliance 
uncertainty (where the regulator is uncertain about the extent of non-compliance/illegal landings) 
may be an important source of information asymmetry. 
  Therefore even though our result both seems relevant for a regulator concerned with 
the risk of stock collapse and implies fairly robust policy recommendations, applying those 
recommendations to any particular fishery would require a complete evaluation of the relative 
efficiency of instruments taking all of the potentially important types of uncertainty into account. In 
any case,  the main contributions of this paper is that we show, contrary to what seems to be the FOI Working Paper 2011 / 6 
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general consensus, that landing fees are able to provide more effective extinction insurance than 
quotas under  the same conditions as those implying that landing fees are better at maximising 
industry profit. We also provide a blueprint for incorporating regulator concerns about extinction 
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